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INTRODUCTION

The intention of this Article, and the brief presentation that accompanied it at the Texas Wesleyan University School of Law Symposium
on The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, is
to highlight the need for a more uniform and consistent application of
contract principles to noncompete contracts in order to increase predictability in this field of law.1 Presently both employees and employers pay a heavy price due to increased uncertainty in this area. This is
because courts use equitable concepts to circumvent basic contract
law principles without recognizing the unseen price that is paid by
others when contract-based predictability is eroded.
To illustrate this point, this Article will begin with six different scenarios that are very real possibilities under the current state of the law
and highlight the practical cost to litigants in the current unpredictable
environment. In addition to highlighting a significant problem created
by the unpredictability in this area of employment contract law, this
Article will also provide the practicing employment law attorney with
a review of different contract options to consider when drafting
noncompete contracts and similar protective agreements. In Part II,
the nature of unpredictability in a number of key foundational concepts like protectable interests, consideration, and choice of law is examined. In Part III, an overview of advantages and disadvantages to
the eight most common forms of restrictive contracts are covered to
illustrate that no one contract option solves the present unpredictability problem and to provide the practicing attorney with a helpful
checklist of contract options to consider. To conclude, a suggestion
for a more balanced approach to improve predictability is provided.
A.

Illustrating the Cost of Unpredictability

In order to understand the cost of unpredictability created by the
current state of the law on noncompete contracts and other agreements against unfair competition, it is helpful to examine a number of
likely scenarios. In the first scenario, you represent a company that is
seeking to hire a marketing executive who recently left a competing
company. Your company provided an offer letter to the prospective
employee and you now learn, via a demand letter from the old employer, that the prospective employee signed a noncompete. You are
1. This Article is submitted for discussion purposes only and is not legal advice.
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and not those of Littler
Mendelson P.C.
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in one of the majority of states where noncompete contracts are enforced under limited circumstances. You have the contract examined
by outside counsel who advises that enforcement of the noncompete
contract is unpredictable because it depends on how good a job the
candidate's former employer did at protecting its trade secrets and
how much of this information the candidate received. Your company
does not want to take the risk of protracted litigation and turns the
applicant away and hires another candidate. The prospective employee has lost a good job opportunity, and your company has lost its
best candidate. The cautious approach is costly.
Scenario two is similar to scenario one, but seen from the employee's perspective. The employee quits a fairly stable job where he
was unhappy because he is confident that he can quickly get a job
elsewhere. He has signed a noncompete contract but is of the common belief that because this is a "right to work state," 2 the noncompete will not be enforced. "Everyone knows those things are not
enforceable," he tells a friend. Six months later he is still unemployed.
The guesswork approach is costly.
Under scenario three, an employee of your company who is heavily
involved in marketing and new product development leaves and goes
to work for a competitor. You have no contracts in place because you
are of the understanding that noncompete contracts are so widely disfavored that such contracts are largely useless. Three months later the
competitor comes up with a marketing campaign that rivals what it
took your company three years of trial and error to develop. You
pursue a legal action but the court quickly rejects your inevitable disclosure of trade secrets argument, noting that if you wanted protection
against this, you should have covered it with a noncompete contract;
and the court will not make one for you after the fact.' The competitors' profitability shoots up, and your company's position sinks. Layoffs follow. Numerous employees lose their jobs. Again, the cautious
and light-handed employer approach proves costly.
Under scenario four, a management-level employee with six successful sales employees under her supervision receives an attractive
offer (i.e., big pay raise) to go to work for another company and develop a competing line of business. She talks to the six employees
working under her who agree to go with her. She has a noncompete
contract that she believes she can get set aside on legal grounds be2. In reality, the "right to work state" label refers to those states where an employee has the right to be employed without mandatory union membership and is
frequently misunderstood.
3. See ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Ark. 2000) (faulting ConAgra for failing to have a noncompete or nondisclosure agreement with executives in place); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (criticizing an inevitable disclosure argument because "[the parties] did not
agree upon a covenant not to compete. We decline to impose one, however restricted
in scope, by adopting the inevitable disclosure doctrine.").
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cause the law regarding what constitutes good consideration for such a
contract has changed in the state where she lives. Three of the employees who go with her only have confidentiality agreements, and
three others have no contracts at all. A legal action follows where the
contract is found to be unenforceable, but the court concludes that the
new business would inevitably involve the use of trade-secret customer information and that the management level employee violated
her duty of loyalty to the old employer by soliciting the employees to
join her. The court enjoins all seven of the former employees from
working in the competitor's new business line. The customers abandon both companies and take their work elsewhere. The new employer faces a large damage claim.
Under scenario five, we have the same scenario as above, except the
court finds for the departing manager and refuses to issue any injunctive relief. However, when the management level employee was
hired, the owner of the business took her under his wing and introduced her to all of his customers. For five years, he paid her to develop and expand the customer base. The business owner hired
twenty new employees based on the growth of the business. He is just
beginning to turn a good profit and recover some of the costs invested
over the last five years. It is at this point that the trusted management
employee leaves and takes six employees and most of the customers
with her. The new competitor will have none of the start up and investment costs that the old company sank into the business, so it is
instantly profitable at little cost and can afford to pay the newly hired
executive more because of this difference. The old company is destroyed and sinks into bankruptcy. Employees lose their jobs.
Finally, in scenario six, you represent the employer stung in scenario three. You shift gears to a more aggressive stand and insist that all
employees above a certain level sign noncompete agreements. One of
your employees in California refuses to sign the noncompete and is
terminated. The employee sues for wrongful discharge under California's expansive public-policy exception and wins.4 Your company is
hit with a sizable damage award, and the employee is out of work.
If the parties had a reasonably limited contract that was predictably
enforceable, would they have acted differently in each of the above
referenced scenarios? Would they have avoided the cost of unpredictability? Couldn't reasonable limitations be established in a contract
that protects legitimate business interests such as trade secrets, confidential information, and customer goodwill without unreasonably limiting the employee's mobility? Are there ways to create a disincentive
to employer over-reaching that will not result in an "all or nothing"
end result? These questions may be rhetorical, but they highlight significant issues.
4. See, e.g., D'Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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For many years courts have struggled to maintain a balance between (a) protecting healthy competition and employee mobility and
(b) the need to protect legitimate business interests that may be compromised by the conversion of valuable information and business
goodwill invested in the employee. The result is a hodge podge of
conflicting and uncoordinated laws, and common law principles that
create a nightmare of unpredictability for the practicing attorney looking for tools to use other than contract restrictions.5 On one side, free
markets and open competition are highly valued and even statutorily
protected.6 Employee mobility is recognized as a critical cog in the
wheel of commerce. Employees are often the subject of protective
laws designed to prevent employers from taking advantage of the
greater bargaining leverage generally enjoyed by them.7
On the other side, it can be argued that a critical part of our economy is now dependent upon the ability to capture, protect, and sell
valuable information and services that are easily compromised by departing employees. Service sector jobs now amount to more than
40% of American jobs.' Service jobs are inherently information
heavy. Something that sounds as simple as a customer list can now
represent a vast pool of knowledge developed at considerable time
and expense that includes information about historical purchasing
trends, credit history, and analysis of future needs for a company's
customers. In one case, this may be a protectable trade secret; 9 in
another it will not be.10 In some cases, the odds of protecting a trade

5. See Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in
Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 485 (1990) (noting that the tremendous
volume and variety of case law makes predictability very difficult for practicing
attorneys).
6. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2002).
7. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
8. See Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargainingfor Loyalty in the Information Age:
A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee
Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163,1199 & n.123 (2001) (citing Anthony P. Carnevale
& Donna Desrochers, Training in the Dilbert Economy, 53 TRAINING & DEV. 32, 32
(1999) and STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG ET AL., NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY:
EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 2-3 (The Twentieth
Century Fund Book 1998) (1998)). Special acknowledgment is due to the above referenced article by Arnow-Richman, which was heavily relied upon as a source of information incorporated here.
9. See Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593, 600-02 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied); Centrol, Inc. v. Morrow, 489 N.W.2d 890, 894-95

(S.D. 1992).
10. See, e.g., Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537 P.2d 330, 334-35 (Okla. 1975)
(holding that most of the customer list was available anywhere and did not constitute
a trade secret).
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secret are greatly increased with a contract;1" in others they are not. 2
In yet others, the failure to use a contract can be fatal. 3
Geographic barriers are gone. As mobile employees move from
state to state, the ability to define what protection will exist, if any,
becomes increasingly unpredictable. Modern technology makes older
concepts about competition within certain geographical boundaries almost meaningless. Anyone with access to a computer or a cell phone
can compete and transmit huge volumes of valuable information with
the click of a button from almost anywhere. There is a genuine need
for one uniform solution that parties can rely on for predictable
results.
Below, a number of contract options are submitted for purposes of
discussion and consideration. This is not intended to be a national
survey on the subject. A variety of different state's laws will be referred to for purposes of illustration only.
II.

THE FOUNDATION OF UNPREDICTABILITY

A.

Protectable Interest

A restraint against competition with no purpose other than to prevent competition is considered a naked restraint of trade and will ordinarily not be enforced.1 4 However, there are exceptions where the
restrictions at issue are necessary to protect a legitimate business in15
terest. This is sometimes referred to as the "rule of reason" test.
The same kind of balancing act occurs in the application of common
law causes of action like trade secret misappropriation. 16 However,
the balancing test comes into sharp focus most obviously in the context of contractual restrictions. As one commentator stated:
11. See Simplified Telesys v. Live Oak Telecom, L.L.C., 68 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (stating that the employer must demonstrate "a
breach of the confidentiality agreements by misappropriation of a 'trade secret' or the
use of any other information coming within the prohibition contained in the agreements... ").
12. See T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 22
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (noting that simply designating information as confidential will not suffice).
13. See ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 725, 730-31 (Ark. 2000)
(finding that failure to use a confidentiality agreement or noncompete contract was
evidence of lack of adequate measures to protect trade secrets); Del Monte Fresh
Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (rejecting a
request to enjoin employee from seeking employment because employer did not enter
into a noncompete agreement).
14. See Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984) (citing All
Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Mass. 1974)) ("An employer, however,
cannot by contract restrain ordinary competition.").
15. See Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements:
A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 709 (1985).
16. See id. at 716.
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This balancing of interests takes place within a developed doctrinal
framework that contains specified prerequisites to enforcement. At
the threshold, employers must show that they have an underlying
interest that the law is willing to recognize. Employers have no
right to enforce a noncompete merely for purposes of indenturing
an employee to his or her current post, nor any right to prevent
competition per se. To avoid unfair effects on employees and competitors, courts require the presence of special interests or circumstances that justify a restriction. 17
Exceptions have been recognized for reasonable restraintsdesigned:
(1) to protect18 trade secrets and confidential information of the
o company;
(2) to protect customer goodwill
developed for the company (cus19
tomer relationships);
(3) to protect overall business goodwill and assets that20have been
sold (noncompetes used in the sale of a business);
21
(4) to protect unique and specialized training;
(5) for situations in which the employer has contracted for the services of an individual of unique value because of who they are
(e.g., performers, professional athletes); 22 and
(6) for pinnacle employees in charge of an organization.2 3
Employers have also been allowed to use restrictive covenants to
protect existing employment relationships and guard against employee raiding. However, this is often considered a different type of
agreement or restraint.2 4
Not every state will consider an employer's interest in protecting
one or more of the legitimate business interests described above as
adequate justification for placing a restraint on an employee's ability
to compete.2 5 For example, California generally prohibits true
noncompete contracts except where the sale of a business or actual
17. Arnow-Richman, supra note 8, at 1175.
18. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 684 (Tex. 1990); TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2002) (referencing goodwill as a legitimate
interest).
19. See § 15.50.

20. See Oliver v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 792, 797-801 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
21. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684.
22. See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp.
495, 501 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (recognizing special character of talent agreements for professional athletes, etc.).
23. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (2001) (allowing noncompete contracts
for top management personnel, officers, and their professional staff).
24. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774
(E.D. Mich. 1999); Totino v. Alexander & Assocs., Inc., No. 01-97-01204-CV, 1998
WL 552818, at *8-9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20, 1998, no pet.) (not
designated for publication).
25. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987).
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misappropriation of trade secrets is involved.2 6 Colorado will allow a
noncompete for protection of trade secrets, to recover expenses for
training, and for certain high level executives and their professional
staff.2 7 Likewise, from state to state there are variations in the nature
and degree of the protection afforded to these interests and the circumstances in which they will be enforced.2 8
B. Common Law Protections
1. Application of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Some creative employers are beginning to use contracts that reference, and state as their purpose, the prevention of inevitable. disclosure of trade secrets. Disclosure of trade secrets is probably the most
universally recognized legitimate business interest warranting a restraint on competition, so using contract language that focuses on this
interest is logical. In this type of provision, the contract states that the
trade secrets would be inevitably disclosed if the employee went to
work for a certain list or category of competing companies and
worked in a certain role. The drafter seeks to capitalize on the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and contractually stipulate
to its application. No case could be located that directly addresses this
type of provision. The states are mixed on how the common law concept should be applied.2 9
Standing alone as a common law claim, application of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine as part of a misappropriation of trade secrets or
confidential information claim is not a very effective solution. In theory, the inevitable disclosure doctrine would be used to provide injunctive relief against a former employee even if the employee did not
sign a noncompete agreement or if the employee's noncompete is held
unenforceable. Typically, to prove inevitable disclosure, an employer
will have to show that: (a) the former employee had access to trade
secrets or confidential information, (b) the employee was hired by a
competitor who would gain an advantage from use of this information,
and (c) the employee's position with the competitor will unavoidably
result in the use of this information because the employee will not be
able to perform his or her duties for the new employer without using
26. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-16601 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003);
Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1338 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987).
27. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2001).
28. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (explaining that
in special categories, such as the sale of goodwill and franchise relationships, there is a
two year limitation); Bail Bonds Unlimited, Inc. v. Chedville, 01-1401 (La. App. 5 Cir.
10/29/02), 831 So. 2d 403, 406, writ denied, 2002-2913 (La. 2/7/03), 836 So. 2d 104
(applying the statute only when employee is starting his own business, not when going
to work for another).
29. See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 291 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
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the information. 3 ° However, a number of the more recent decisions
have been critical of the inevitable disclosure doctrine on the grounds
that it should not be applied where it would act as a backdoor means
of achieving a noncompete type restriction without meeting state law
requirements normally placed on such a restriction when applied
through contract. 3' More importantly for the analysis here, a common
law doctrine of this nature does not have the advantage of clear notice
to all parties regarding individually defined and negotiated boundaries
that a contract restriction can provide. Instead, the parties do not
know exactly where a court may draw the lines until the litigation cost
is absorbed. Thus, even where the doctrine is helpful as a common
law alternative, it does not advance the ball on increasing true
predictability.
2.

Tortious Interference as an Alternative

A number of recent decisions have shifted the focus of unfair competition claims away from contractual obligations and toward the
common law claim of tortious interference. The distinction in the Restatement of Torts between tortious interference with a contract and
tortious interference with a prospective business relationship is widely
recognized. 32 Interference with an existing contract often does not require the additional element of independent wrongfulness in order to
be actionable, whereas tortious interference with a prospective business relationship does.33 It stands to reason that there is an advantage
to the employer in creating contractual obligations that are subject to
interference. However, the end result is still often dependent on the
enforceability of the underlying contract restriction or the presence of
some common law cause of action with more ambiguous boundaries.
The result is not a good practical solution to the unpredictability
problem.
C. Consideration
1. Can a Contract Provision Solve the Consideration Issue?
The answer is "yes" and "no." Yes, recognition of specific consideration is generally helpful for enforcement just as it would be with any
30. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995); FMC Corp.
v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 503-05 (5th Cir. 1982); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F.
Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
31. See Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293; Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole
Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (rejecting the doctrine of inevitable disclosure).
32. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77-78 (Tex.
2000) (stating elements of interference with existing contract); Allied Capital Corp. v.
Cravens, 67 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (stating elements of interference with prospective business relations).
33. See Altrutech, Inc. v. Hooper Holmes, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1276-77 (D.
Kan. 1998).
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contract. No, there is no one uniform way to do it in most circumstances because what constitutes adequate consideration varies too
much between states and circumstances. In many states, the company's willingness to employ an individual and/or put him in a position
where one or more protectable business interests are implicated will
be considered adequate consideration.3 4

In other states, more unique consideration must be provided. This
is particularly true for noncompetes that are executed mid-stream.
A promotion or change in position will sometimes be enough, as will
additional compensation. 36 However, the courts are certainly not consistent on this point,37 and if the employee is given no real choice, the
scenario will still invite arguments about duress or invalidity due to

the contract of adhesion doctrine.
In Texas, a unique problem exists because the statute has been interpreted to require more when contracts covered by the statute as a
"restriction against competition" are concerned.3 8 The Texas statute
has been interpreted so as to make the character of the consideration,
rather than the quantity of the consideration, controlling. 39 The Texas
statute requires that the noncompete agreement be ancillary to an
"otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is

made."40 The ancillary agreement at issue must also meet the following two part test: (1) the consideration provided by the employer in
the ancillary agreement "must give rise to the employer's interest in
restraining the employee from competing," and (2) the noncompete

restraints at issue "must be designed to enforce the employee's consideration or return promise" in the ancillary agreement (the Light
test).4 1 This approach creates a great deal of unpredictability and an
"all or nothing" result in many cases.
34. See 1 BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE,
STATE SURVEY 307-10, 346-47, 412-13, 538-39, 1101-02 (Samuel M.

A STATE-BYBrock, III &

Arnold H. Pedowitz eds., 3d ed. 2002).
35. See CRC-Evans Pipeline Int'l, Inc. v. Myers, 927 S.W.2d 259, 264-65 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
36. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Tucker, 768 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
37. See CRC-Evans Pipeline Int'l, Inc., 927 S.W.2d at 263-65; Ashland Oil, Inc.,
768 S.W.2d at 601.
38. See Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex. 1994).
39. See id. at 647-48.
40. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2002).
41. The most common example of a contract that meets the Light test is the following exchange: (1) the employer makes an enforceable promise to give employee
trade secrets, (2) in return, the employee promises not to disclose or engage in unauthorized use of the trade secrets, and (3) the parties agree to a set of post-termination
restrictions that restrain the employee from engaging in conduct where she is likely to
break her promise not to disclose (e.g., working for a competitor, soliciting customers,
etc.). A successful application of this approach through an independent trade secret
clause can be seen in the case of Ireland v. Franklin, 950 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1997, no writ) (enforcing the noncompete agreement and noting that the
agreement had carefully followed the Light blueprint). See also Flake v. EGL Eagle
Global Logistics, L.P., No. 14-01-01069-CV, 2002 WL 31008136, at *3 (Tex. App.-
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D. Scope of Restraint
1. Are There any Contractual Boundaries that are
Uniformly Enforced?
The scope of the permissible restraint varies greatly from state to
state as well. The most uniformly enforced restrictions seem to be
those that focus on prohibiting solicitation of customers as opposed to
more generalized geographic restraints against competition.4 2 However, this is one of the areas where a one-contract-fits-all approach
becomes most difficult, if not impossible. Many states take many different approaches to what is a reasonable restriction. In one state,
there may be a presumption of enforceability if the restriction is under
two years.4 3 In another, the geography must be limited in a very specific way or the contract will not be enforced at all.4 4 In one state, a
customer specific restriction can be used to substitute for a geographic
boundary, while in another state it will not. 5 In one state, a general
reference to "competing activity" may be sufficient. In another, the
failure to define the scope of competing activity with particularity may
be fatal. In yet another, only the starting of a new business may be
covered while moving to an existing business may not be. 6
E. Blue Pencil Rules and Over Broad Restrictions
1. Can Problems with the Scope of the Restrictions be Overcome
Through a Provision Authorizing Judicial Reformation of
the Agreement?
A contractual clause allowing for the revision or "blue-penciling" of
the contract will rarely be recognized as a method to override the existing contract revision limitations that a state's common law rules of
contract construction place on the judge. There are significant variances between states on this issue. As a general rule, they can be
broken down into three categories: 1) the delete-the-offending-language-only approach (Indiana, Louisiana); 2) the reforming and redrafting approach (Florida, Ohio, Texas); and 3) the no revisions
Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 5, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (stating
and applying the Light test); Bandit Messenger of Austin, Inc. v. Contreras, No. 0300-00359-CV, 2000 WL 1587664, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 26, 2000, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) ("A promise by the employer to give an employee trade
secrets in return for the employee's promise to keep them secret has been found to be
one type of non-illusory promise that can support a covenant not to compete.").
42. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 8, at 1175-80 (surveying cases). See generally
1 MALSBERGER, supra note 34 (compiling the states' requirements for enforcement of
employment agreements).
43. See 1 MALSBERGER, supra note 34, at 419.
44. 1 id. at 565-78.
45. 1 id. at 578-79, 777.
46. See Bail Bonds Unlimited, Inc. v. Chedville, 01-1401 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/
02), 831 So. 2d 403, 406, writ denied, 2002-2913 (La. 2/7/03), 836 So. 2d 104.
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allowed-all or nothing approach (Georgia, Missouri, Wisconsin,
California) .47
In Texas, the approach is dictated by statute. 48 The enforcing employer loses the right to recover damages if the contract has to be
reformed in order to be enforceable, and may even be responsible for
the attorney's fees of the opposing party if the opposing party can
show that the employer knew the contract was overbroad at the time
it was entered into. 49 This is a logical way to create a balance of interests, but it has not been adopted in other states.
Consequently, it is dangerous for an employer to overreach when
drafting a noncompete on the theory that it is better to be overbroad
than to be too narrow and miss something that needed protection. In
reality, it is probably better to be narrow and protect a critical core
business interest than it is to be overbroad and have all of the restrictions thrown out together as unenforceable, leaving the core interests
unprotected. However, defining the core protectable interest requires
predictability. As noted above, beyond trade secrets, it is unclear
what a protectable interest will be from one state to the next.50
F. Choice of Law and Venue
1. Can a Contractual Choice of Law and Venue Avoid the
Unpredictability of State Law Variances?
It does not appear that a contractual choice of law and venue fixing
clause will cure the unpredictability created by state law variances.
Although states vary, the predominant approach to this issue is to use
the Restatement of Conflicts analysis. 5' This analysis results in a focus
on which state has the materially greater interest (i.e., the most substantial relationship and compelling state public policy interest) in the
dispute. 52 As a practical matter, this will often boil down to who won
the race to the courthouse as most courts will tend to favor their own
state's law in this kind of analysis. Venue fixing provisions can be
helpful,53 but they are not a complete cure. Some states, like Louisiana, now even prohibit them in this kind of contract.54 In addition,
47. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 8, at 1179 n.47.
48. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §15.51 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2003).
49. Id. § 15.51(c).
50. See supra Part II.
51. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (explaining
what law prevails when no provision is made in the agreement by the parties).
52. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 678.
53. See Holeman v. Nat'l Bus. Inst. Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 94-95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (dismissing declaratory judgment action due to
choice of forum clause selecting Georgia).
54. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921.A(2) (West Supp. 2003) (indicating that a
forum clause or choice of law clause shall be null and void in a noncompete unless
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personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens challenges will often
be a significant hurdle.
III.

THE EIGHT MOST COMMON CONTRACT SOLUTIONS:
ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES

A.

Nondisclosure/ConfidentialityAgreements

This kind of agreement simply provides that the employee will not
disclose or engage in unauthorized use of company trade secrets and
confidential information. There is some debate over whether or not
the information at issue has to be truly "secret" to be protectable as a
trade secret.
For this reason, it is advantageous to define trade
secrets and confidential information separately, and then provide for
the contractual protection of both. It is best to use broad definitions
and avoid trying to create comprehensive lists of what is protected.
The nondisclosure obligation is usually not limited by time or geography.56 One approach is to provide that the nondisclosure clause will
remain in effect for as long as the employer maintains the information
as confidential with a presumption that this period will be at least two
years.57
Advantages: Nondisclosure agreements are widely enforced.5 8 They
can give the employer an argument for recovery of attorneys' fees that
it would not have in a common law trade secret dispute.5 9 Sometimes
they can be used in connection with the inevitable disclosure doctrine
to prevent an employee from working in a job where disclosure is
inevitable.60
Disadvantages: The breach of a nondisclosure agreement can be
hard to discover and/or prove. Once a violation occurs, the employer
is likely to be harmed in a way that cannot be repaired. The proverbial "genie is out of the bottle." It is not a very effective way to protect customer relationships, because much of the information on
customers will not qualify for trade secret status. It will not protect
the goodwill of a business, and courts have a disturbing tendency to
"ratified by the employee after the occurrence of the incident which is the subject of
the civil or administrative action").

55. See Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593, 602 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1995, writ denied); 2 MALSBERGER, supra note 34, at 2163-67.
56. See Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
no writ); 2 MALSBERGER, supra note 34, at 2167.

57. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2003) (presuming unreasonable "any restraint more than [two] years in duration").
58. See, e.g., Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456, 458-59 (Cal. 1958) (showing that
California's general prohibition on noncompetes was not offended by nondisclosure
agreement).

59. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.
2003).
60. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1995).
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use injunctive relief in a limited way that tends to give an employee
"one free bite" at the trade secret apple.6
B.

No-Raiding of Employees (Anti-Piracy) Agreement

This is a promise by the former employee not to hire away or solicit
employees to leave the company for some period of time.
Advantages: In some states, it may not be construed as a noncompete agreement and therefore, may be treated less critically by the
courts.6 2

Disadvantages:It can often be difficult to prove, because the former
employee can usually claim that "he called me looking for a job; I did
not solicit him." This restriction does not protect trade secrets or customer goodwill very effectively. An employee can leave and harm
protectable interests without engaging in employee raiding.
C.

"Non-Solicitation of Customers" Agreement

The employee promises not to solicit company customers for a specific time. The scope of customers covered will usually be limited in
some way, unless the employee is at a high level within the company.
In many states, the company cannot prohibit solicitation of all company customers because the employee will not have had contact with
all of the customers (i.e., no goodwill to protect) and will not have
handled confidential information about all of the customers.6 3
Advantages: It is narrowly tailored to protect existing customer relationships. Consequently, it is one of the most widely enforced restrictive covenants. 64 Some states will not view "non-solicitation of
customers" agreements as true noncompetes.6 5
Disadvantages:A breach can be difficult to prove for the same reasons a breach of a no-raiding clause can be (discussed above). It is not
entirely clear that a customer specific restraint can be used to substitute for a restraint with a geographic limitation in some states. In
most states, this substitution is allowed. 66 It addresses customer goodwill, but not necessarily trade secret issues.
61. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556,
561-62 (4th Cir. 1990) (criticizing the reluctance of courts to issue injunctive relief
before misappropriation has occurred because it means the employee "tends to get
'one free bite' at the trade secret").
62. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774
(E.D. Mich. 1999); Totino v. Alexander & Assocs., Inc., No. 01-97-01204-CV, 1998
WL 552818, at *8-9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20, 1998, no pet.) (not
designated for publication).
63. See, e.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-88 (Tex.
1991); see 1 MALSBERGER, supra note 34, at 565-66, 710, 774-75.
64. See 1 MALSBERGER, supra note 34, at 290, 316, 350, 375, 710, 777.
65. See Sevier Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Willis Corroon Corp. of Birmingham, 711 So. 2d
995, 998-99 (Ala. 1998); Haass, 818 S.W.2d at 385.
66. See 1 MALSBERGER, supra note 34, at 290, 316, 350, 375, 710, 777.
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D.

True Noncompete Agreement

The employee promises not to do certain kinds of work for a competing company for a specific period of time within a certain
geography.
Advantages: A breach is often easy to spot and prove. Either the
ex-employee is working for a competitor in a certain geography or
not.
Disadvantages:Some states completely prohibit them,6 7 and almost
all states view them critically.6" Defining the boundaries can be very
difficult and will tend to require individually tailored contracts by person or by job in order to be so narrow that it can survive in states
where no blue pencil reformation by the court is allowed.
E. Noncompetes Tied to Stock or Stock Options/Using
Stock as Consideration
It is increasingly common to see noncompete provisions tied to
stock options or stock grants. The stock is used as the consideration.
There are a number of uncertainties with this approach. There are
few published opinions on it.69 The employer may have difficulty convincing a court that injunctive relief against competition is the proper
remedy, since monetary damages based on the value of the stock
would be quantifiable. In addition, if stock options are forfeited for a
violation of the noncompete, this forfeiture may be viewed as a satisfactory remedy.
F. Mandatory Advance Notice and Notice Period
This is a promise by the employee that he or she will give the company a specific amount of notice before leaving and will advise the
company if he or she is going to work for a competitor.7 v
67. See 1 id. at 231.
68. See 1 id. at 242-43, 286, 407-12, 534-38; 2 MALSBERGER, supra note 34, at
2167-75.
69. See IBM v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that this
kind of agreement was different from a true noncompete because it only provided for
forfeiture of stock and was, therefore, not a violation of California's state law against
noncompetes); Olander v. Compass Bank, 172 F. Supp. 2d 846, 855 (S.D. Tex. 2001),
affd, 2002 WL 1396903 (5th Cir. 2002) (not designated for publication) (deciding
there was no evidence that employer's grant of stock options to at-will employee gave
rise to its interest in restricting employee from competing; however, the court added
that it was not ruling "that a stock option agreement can never give rise to an interest
in restraining competition"); Totino v. Alexander & Assocs., Inc., No. 01-97-01204CV, 1998 WL 552818, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20, 1998, no pet.)
(not designated for publication) (holding stock option award was an ancillary agreement supporting noncompete).
70. See Hansson v. Time Warner Entm't Advance, No. 03-01-00578-CV, 2002 WL
437297, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 21, 2002, pet. filed) (not designated for publication) (holding provision requiring that Hansson give the company 30 days notice
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Advantages: This notice is not likely to be considered with the same
hostility as a noncompete agreement. 7' Advance notice of a competing job gives the old employer time to pursue injunctive relief before
irreparable harm is done. As long as the employee remains employed
and on the payroll of the company during the notice period, he or she
will have a duty of loyalty to the employer not to engage in competition or other activities that harm the employer.
Disadvantages:The employee is either 'relieved of active duties and
asked to sit out the remainder of the notice period, or remains an
employee working alongside others. In both scenarios, the employee
would remain on the payroll of the company in order to trigger the
continuing duty of loyalty. In the first scenario, the employee is paid
to do nothing. In the second scenario, the employee is in the workplace and more likely to cause harm to employee morale, etc.
G.

Post-Termination Consulting Period/Payfor No-Play Approach

Employee promises that upon termination of employment, he or
she will remain a consultant for a set period of time during which he
or she will continue to receive some pay from the employer and during which time the employee (now consultant) will refrain from competing. This approach is sometimes referred to as a "garden leave"
agreement based on an English contract law concept.7 2
Advantages: This approach has equitable appeal to courts because
the employee is continuing to receive compensation. Because the individual is still acting for the company as a consultant, the contract is
less likely to be viewed as a post-termination of employment restraint
on competition. Instead, it is more like an extension of the ordinary
duty of loyalty requirement for an employee.
Disadvantages: A competitor can simply buy out the value of the
consulting agreement to the employee by offering him or her enough
money to offset the consulting payments. If the employee refuses to
continue to serve in the role of a consultant and refuses the payments
offered by the company, it is unclear whether or not the company
could enforce any restrictions against competition by the former
employee.

upon receiving an offer from a competitor was not a post-termination noncompete
restriction covered by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2002)).
71. Id. at *6-7.
72. See John Fellas, Garden Leave: A New Weapon Against a Departing Employee,
N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1997, at 1, 4; W. Gary Fowler, Drafting Effective Noncompetition
Covenants: The Incredible Darkness of Light v. Centel Cellular, DALLAS B. Ass'N
LAB. & EMP. SEC., Aug. 19, 2002, at 1-12; Peter E. Calamari, Protection of Confidential Business Information, PRACTISING L. INST., Feb.-Apr. 2001, at 35, 47.
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H.

Liquidated Damages/ForfeitureClauses

Employee promises to pay some fixed liquidated damage if he or
she goes to work for a competitor or solicits a customer away. Alternatively, the employee agrees to forfeit certain monies or benefits that
he/she would otherwise be entitled to if he/she violates the noncompete or non-raiding restrictions.
Advantages: There is an argument that this is not a true noncompete
because it does not prohibit competition; it simply puts a price on it
that the employee must pay in order to compete.7 3 If it is not considered a noncompete agreement in restraint of trade, it is much more
likely to be enforced.
Disadvantages: Many courts do not buy the argument that such a
clause is not a noncompete. 4 For example, the Texas Supreme Court
has specifically rejected this argument.7 5 In addition, this approach
invites the competitor to buy the employee away by offering him or
her enough to offset the liquidated damage or forfeiture.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing contract options reflect, no one contract solution
emerges as a strong, predictable, and reliable solution. As the beginning of this discussion illustrates, there is a steep price for the unpredictability this creates. A uniform set of guidelines for contract
construction and application in this subject area is badly needed.
Some form of uniform covenants not to compete act would be of significant help. A balanced approach like that originally contemplated
by the Texas statute that allows for blue-penciling but creates an incentive to draft such agreements narrowly by shifting attorney's fees
would seem to be a logical approach. This would help curb employer
over-reaching and avoid "all or nothing" results.76 Most importantly,
some uniform recognition of what is a protectable interest would relieve much of the present instability.
Attacking the creation of a contract with contract of adhesion doctrine or statutes prohibiting noncompete contracts all together is not
helpful. It drives litigants towards common law options that are even
more ambiguous in their application and less predictable for the parties. Parties need predictability before litigation begins to help guide
their decision making. Guesswork that results from unpredictability
often results in a heavy price paid by those who guess wrong. On the
other side, constantly erring on the side of caution also causes unnec73. See IBM, 191 F.3d at 1040-41 (presenting an example of ways that courts are
interpreting types of noncompetes).
74. See, e.g., Junkin v. Northeast Ark. Internal Med. Clinic, P.A., 42 S.W.3d 432,
438 (Ark. 2001).
75. Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tex. 1991).
76. However, the Light test used in Texas law would not be a useful model to
follow.
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essary harm, as well. Contract law is best suited to address the issues
raised with employee mobility because contracts can be customized to
the particular business or position at issue.
However, until a uniform set of guidelines is adopted, contracts will
remain an unpredictable device. This is an area of law that is often
driven by the facts of particular cases. The result is a results-oriented
reasoning by courts that creates a challenge for practitioners everywhere. Many years ago, one court looking at this subject said:
This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot find enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary, there is so
much authority it drowns him. It is a sea-vast and vacillating,
overlapping and bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of
strange support for anything, if he lives so long. 77
More than fifty years later, the sea is (in an understatement) bigger.
77. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687
(Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. 1952).
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